In this paper we present new data from Ewe that show that the logophoric pronoun yè doesn’t always have to be bound directly by an attitude verb, as suggested in the literature, cf. Schlenker (2003); von Stechow (2004); Pearson (2015). Logophoric pronouns can also be bound by non-attitudinal intervening operators as long as these operators stand in a binding chain with the licensing attitude verb.

The data. The examples we discuss involve the construction ko yè corresponding to English ‘only’ as in (1).

(1) Ko fí súsú be yè ko yè wó yè-fe do Ko think COMP log only foc do log-poss work
   ‘Kofi thinks that he is the only one who did his work’

This sentence can be read with a strict interpretation for the second occurrence of yè as paraphrased in (2-a). This is as expected. It is crucial now that the example in (1) can also have a sloppy interpretation for the second occurrence of yè as paraphrased in (2-b).

(2) a. ‘Kofi thinks that he is the only one (of a salient group of individuals) of whom the property \( \lambda x. x \) does Kofi’s job \) is true’. strict interpretation for (1)
   b. ‘Kofi thinks that he is the only one (of a salient group of individuals) of whom the property \( \lambda x. x \) does x’s job \) is true.’ sloppy interpretation for (1)

It is the sloppy interpretation in (2-b) that is not predicted under common assumptions about the semantics of ‘only’ and the semantic binding conditions for logophoric pronouns as suggested in the literature, cf. Schlenker (2003); von Stechow (2004); Pearson (2015). The existence of the sloppy interpretation for the second occurrence of yè in (1) was confirmed by one of the authors and two consultants and doesn’t seem to be controversial. In fact, the only way to get the intended sloppy interpretation is by reusing the logophoric pronoun yè as in (1).

Background assumption: binding by verbs. It is a well established fact in the literature on the logophoric pronoun yè in Ewe that it can only occur in the context of an attitude report, Clements (1975); Schlenker (1999); Pearson (2015). The restriction to attitude contexts has been modelled by Schlenker (1999, 2003); von Stechow (2003, 2004); Pearson (2015) as “binding by attitudes”. According to this view, logophoric pronouns are a special kind of anaphoric pronoun the features of which can only be checked by an attitude verb as its binder. The way this idea is implemented by the different authors differs only in the semantic details. A general schematic illustration of the basic idea is the following: The logophoric pronoun yè comes with an uninterpretable logophoric feature (= \( \text{iLog} \)) that needs to be checked. Attitude verbs come with a binder index that carries a corresponding interpretable feature (= \( 1[\text{iLog}] \)) in (3). Only if the logophoric pronoun is bound by a binder index with a corresponding interpretable \( \text{iLog} \)-feature, it’s feature is licensed. If licensed, the complement is interpreted as a property of centered worlds which results in a de se-interpretation when combined with the attitude verb, cf. Pearson (2015) for the most recent discussion.

(3) Kofi thinks \( 1[\text{iLog}] \left[ yè \right] \) is smart

Background: sloppy readings with only. For the meaning of ko yè (‘only’), we assume that it has the same semantic contribution in Ewe as only in English on Heim (2008)’s account.

(4) \[ \text{only} = \lambda x. \lambda f.(c,t). \{ y : f(y) = 1 \} = \{ x \} \] (Heim, 2008, p. 44)
Heim (2008) assumes that only is a quantifier that needs to move on LF and can bind pronouns in its semantic scope. The sloppy interpretation for the sentence in (5-a) is accounted for by Heim (2008) by a movement operation on LF that binds the lower pronoun as in (5-b).

\( (5) \)

a. Only Kofi did his job.  

\( \text{compare (Heim, 2008, p. 43: example (24))} \)

b. LF: \[ [\text{only Kofi}] \) 1 \( t_1 \) did his_1 job \)

c. \( [(5-a)] = 1 \text{ iff } \{y: y \text{ did } y's \text{ job} \} = \{\text{Kofi}\} \)

The puzzle. Our claim in this paper is that if we try to combine these assumptions to account for the sloppy interpretation of (1), we find that it is impossible to satisfy the corresponding binding requirements simultaneously. According to the assumption ‘binding by verbs’, ye needs to be bound by the attitude, cf. the corresponding LF in \( (6-a) \). But this only gives us the strict interpretation for (1). For the sloppy interpretation, ye must be bound by only, cf. the LF in \( (6-b) \). But this leaves the \([u\text{LOG}]\)-feature of the second occurrence of the logophoric pronoun unlicensed since it is not bound by the binder index \( 1[u\text{LOG}] \) of the attitude verb (therefore *-marked).

\( (6) \)

a. Ko\( \text{fi thinks-1}[u\text{LOG}][\text{only ye}_1[u\text{LOG}]_2] t_2 \text{ did ye}_2[u\text{LOG}]'s \text{ job} \)

b. * Ko\( \text{fi thinks-1}[u\text{LOG}][\text{only ye}_1[u\text{LOG}]_2] t_2 \text{ did ye}_2[u\text{LOG}]'s \text{ job} \)

On an intuitive level, the problem is that there is a binding operator that intervenes between the attitude verb and the logophoric pronoun. [A similar problem has been observed by Sode (2014) in the modal domain for German subjunctive mood that is characterized by (Schlenker, 2003, p. 75) as “a temporal or modal version of the logophoric pronouns that are found in Ewe”.]

The solution. As a remedy, we propose a sequence rule for logophors (cf. the discussion of feature transmission under binding in Heim (2008)):

\( (7) \)  

\textbf{Sequence rule for logophors in Ewe}

a. A binding operator inherits the logophoric features of its arguments.

b. A binding operator with inherited logophoric features can check all the logophoric features on the pronouns that it binds.

With this additional assumption, we predict both the right interpretation and the right distribution of features for the sloppy interpretation of (1):

\( (8) \)  

Ko\( \text{fi thinks-1}[u\text{LOG}][\text{only ye}_1[u\text{LOG}]_2[u\text{LOG}] t_2 \text{ did ye}_2[u\text{LOG}]'s \text{ job} \)

Theoretical consequences. The new data discussed in this paper also has theoretical consequences for the question whether “binding by attitudes” should be implemented with monsters as proposed in Schlenker (2003) or with a feature checking approach as proposed in von Stechow (2004): It is a clear case in favour of a feature checking approach.